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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Case No, 20779

THOMAS OSSANA,
Defendant/Appellant•

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
A R G U M E N T
Reasons for the Delay
The Brief of Respondent

introduces

considerable

confu-

sion into this appeal by failing to distinguish between two,
legally distinct, proceedings:

the instant criminal prosecu-

tion, State v. Ossana; and Cannon v. Keller, the petition for
extraordinary relief which was brought in the district court
and proceeded
was

stayed

in

to this Court while
the

circuit

court.

the criminal

prosecution

Much of this

confusion

originates in the Record below where the deputy county attorney also failed to maintain the distinction between the two
actions,

even

producing

a

hybrid,

illegitimate

off-spring

which he called, "State of Utah v. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry
Keller."

See, unsigned

document

titled,

"Order

Remanding

Case to Circuit Court for Preliminary Hearing."
B.)

The

Brief

of

Respondent

exploits

this

(R-24)(Appx.
confusion

to

achieve a transubstantiation of delay clearly caused by deliberate

and unjustified

action of the prosecutor

into

delay

"affirmatively caused by the defendant."
All of the delay in the criminal proceeding, from November 12, 1980, until February 7, 1985, is directly attributable to the prosecutor who obtained the order, ex parte, from
the district court in Cannon v. Keller staying all proceedings in the criminal case in the circuit court until Cannon
v. Keller was

resolved.

(R-27)(Appx. A ) .

was not lifted until January 31, 1985.

That stay order

(R-16).

The State in its Brief of Respondent accepts responsibility

for

November
The

only

five

weeks

of

12, 1980, to December

period

from

December

15,

this

delay,

15, 1980.
1980, to

the

period

from

(Resp. Br. 6-7).
February

24, 1982,

which Respondent desianates as "Period Two," is described
Respondent

as

unexplained

delav,

attributable

to

c

neitnev

party because "the record is silent as to t;he reason for tn:s
unusual delay."

(Resp. Br. 7 ) .

to cause of the delay in
period.

The record is not silent: as

the criminal proceeding during this

The record clearly shows that the order (R-27, Appx.

A) which the prosecutor obtained, staying all proceedings in
the criminal case in the circuit court, was still in effect.
The record included in this appeal ijs silent as to what was
-2-

transpiring

during

this period

in the collateral

for extraordinary relief in the district court.
delay

in

the

criminal

case during

proceeding

However, the

this period

is

directly

attributable to the stay order obtained by the prosecutor.
If

something

which

occurred

somehow

lifts

in

the

the

collateral

responsibility

civil

from

proceeding

the

prosecutor

for causing the delay in the criminal proceeding during this
period,

it

should

have

been

included

in

the

record.

A

silent record cannot assist the State in explaining what the
record does show to be delay directly and deliberately caused
by the prosecutor.
The Brief of Respondent attributes the remainder of the
period, during which

the criminal

proceeding was

stayed

in

the circuit court, March 1, 1982, through February 7, 1985,
to affirmative action of the defendant because "the defendant
obtained

an

order

from

the

district

court

court proceedings for a second time (R. 23),"

staying

circuit

(Resp. Br. 7 ) ,

and because the defendant appealed the ruling of the district
court

in the collateral

to this Court.
an

order

proceeding for extraordinary

(Resp. Br. 8 ) .

staying

the

criminal

relief

The defendant never obtained
proceedings

in

the

circuit

The district court below in this criminal case did judicially
notice the record from the collateral case, Cannon v. Keller,
Misc. No. M-80-88. (Trans. April 22, 1985, p. 5, R-207) . However,
that portion of the record was not designated by either party to
this appeal.

court.

The order referred to by Respondent (R. 23)(Appx. C)

stated:
The order captioned, "State of Utah, Plaintiff, vs.
Thomas Ossana, Judge Larry Keller, 5th Circuit
Court, Defendants, Order Remanding Case to Circuit
Court for Preliminary Hearing, Civil No. M-80-88,"
if any such order did issue, is hereby stayed pending a hearing on Respondents' previously filed
motions for rehearing, and Respondents' motions for
rehearing are hereby set for hearing before this
Court on 10[th] day of March, 1982, at the hour of
9:00 a.m.
(R-23)(Appx. C ) .
This

order

was

for extraordinary
merely

to stay

document

obtained,

in the collateral

relief, on motion

any

purporting

effect of

of

proceeding

the defendant here,

that most peculiar, unsigned,

to be an order

"remanding" the criminal

case to the circuit court for preliminary hearing without the
discovery ordered for the reason that the defendant, and the
other

respondent, The Honorable

Larry

Keller, had

not

been

heard on the pending motions in the collateral civil proceeding m

the district court.

(Ibid

Verified Motion, Cannon v.

Keller, vise. No. M-80-88, Acpx. D ) . Assuming that the stayed
order had issued and was a valid order, which the record does
not

support, staying that order until the scheduled hearing

would

have

proceeding
shifts

the
for

indirect
a

the cause

set

effect

period

of

of
ten

delaying
days.

the

criminal

Assuming

that

of delay, the defendant cannot be faulted

for asserting a right: to contest what proved to be a wrongful
infringement: of his

discovery

rights.

-4-

What is more, it is

unlikely

that the other respondent, Judge Keller, would not

have acted if the defendant had refrained since the district
court decision

(R-25) held that circuit courts did not have

jurisdiction to issue orders pertaining to discovery and both
respondents had motions for rehearing pending. (Ibid.)
Although

the

record

in the

instant

case does not show

it, perhaps this Court can determine from judicial notice of
its own record in Cannon v. Keller, Sup. Ct. No. 1844-1, that
the

defendant

here

did

appeal

the

second

decision

of

the

district court in the collateral civil case to this Court and
conclude that, since the criminal case had been stayed until
conclusion

of

the civil case, the appeal indirectly delayed

the criminal case.
collateral

civil

But, to hold that such an appeal in the

case

constitutes

affirmative

delay

of the

criminal case attributable to the defendant and a waiver of
his

right

to

speedy

trial

would

require

the

defendant

to

trade his discovery rights in order to obtain his right to a
speedy trial.
Again, the delay in the criminal proceeding was directly
the result of the prosecutor obtaining an order staying the
proceedings

in

discovery order.

the

circuit

court

while

he

litigated

the

It is true that the delay would have been

shortened had the defendant not defended the discovery order
in the collateral civil proceeding and the respondent Circuit
Court Judge had also not defended that court's jurisdiction.
It

is

also

true

that

the

defendant

-5-

could

have

waived

his

preliminary

hearing

at

the

initial

appearance

before

the

magistrate and been brought to trial in a very short time.
However, there is no authority for the proposition that the
specific

constitutional

right

to

a

speedy

trial

must

be

purchased with the relinquishment of other procedural rights,
not

to mention the relinquishment of a considerable portion

of the jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Perhaps, if a defendant does indicate a desire to delay
a criminal proceeding pending other litigation, as the defendant did in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514- (1972), or engages
in dilatory

tactics in a collateral proceeding, that should

be a factor in applying the balancing test.
case,

the

prosecutor

unilaterally

However, in this

brought

the

collateral

action against the defendant and the Circuit Court Judge, and
obtained the order staying the criminal proceedings ex parte.
The defendant did resist the prosecutor's request for extraordinary

relief

district

court

and did

appeal

the erroneous ruling of the

to this Court, but that hardly

can be con-

strued as consenting to the litigation or the resulting delay
in the criminal proceeding.
It is submitted that the entire fifty-one month period
of delay caused directly by the prosecutor staying the criminal proceeding must be attributed to the State.
The

Brief

of

Respondent

makes

no

serious

effort

to

justify the actions of the deputy county attorney in bringing

-6-

and

pursuing

even

the

dismisses

collateral
the

civil

defendant's

litigation.
arguments

That

brief

concerning

the

State's lack of legitimate interest and the alternatives the
prosecutor had to protect any claimed interest of the State
without delaying the criminal proceeding (See App. Br, 15-16)
as

being

of

issue."
argue
relief

only

"slight

relevance

(Resp. Br. 10, n.2).

that

the

State

to protect

10) when

the

was

to

the

speedy

trial

However, the State can hardly

reasonably

interests

of

seeking

society

interlocutory

(see, Resp. Br.

it was clear that the State had no real interest,

and any interest it might have had could be more effectively
protected by other means which would not infringe the speedy
trial right of the defendant.

Assertion of Right
The

Brief

failure

to

heavily

against

objected
noticed

assert

Respondent
the

the

asserts

right

to

defendant

that

the

the

that

speedy

because

to any continuance.

the continuance
which

of

the

trial
the

(Resp. Br.

defendant's
should

weigh

defendant

never

15).

It must be

defendant had no opportunity to object to
without

prosecutor

date

resulting

obtain

£x

from

parte.

the
This

stay
was

order
not

a

situation as in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where
the defendant stood silent, in apparent agreement, while the
prosecutor

in

open

court

requested

-7-

and

obtained

numerous

continuances

of trial dates

to

await the outcome

of

a co-

defendant ' s tri al.
The only continuances which occurred while defendant was
present were the first one from November 18, 1980, to December

16, 1980, which

continuance
which

from

the court

ordered

defendant did not oppose, and the last

February
ordered

discovery.

7,

1985, to

to allow

(R-5).

The

February

the State

to

14-, 1985,
furnish

last continuance

the

was cer-

tainly opposed by the defendant who made a motion to dismiss
because the discovery had not been completed by the prosecution

despite

this

Court's

upholding

the

validity

of

the

discovery

order months before and because the defendant was

denied

prompt

a

preliminary

hearing.

(Agreed

Statement

Supplementing Record).
As argued in detail in the Brief of Appellant
18-19),
during

the defendant
the

delay

was precluded

before

preliminary

from

(App. Br.

demanding

hearing

caused

a trial
by

the

stay order and by the denial of prompt preliminary hearing,
and

the defendant

did

assert his speedy trial right at the

first opportunity.

Prejudice
The Brief of Respondent interprets Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S.

514

(1972)

as

suggesting

that

a

finding

of

specific

prejudice to the defendant's defense is necessary to warrant

-8-

dismissal

for denial

Br. 16).

However, the United States Supreme Court has held

that

such

error."

an

the right to speedy trial.

interpretation

of

Barker

was

Moore v. Arizona, 414. U.S. 25, 26

authorities
21),

of

the

cited

in the

prejudice

prejudice

to

the

"fundamental

(1973).

Brief of Appellant show

involved

defendant

in

the

which

speedy

usually

(Resp.

As the
(App. Br.

trial

test

is separate

is

from

prejudice to the defense, that is, the defendant's ability to
put on evidence

exonerating

accused,

specific

trial,

has

a

in addition

himself.

The defendant, as an

Sixth Amendment

right

to his Fifth Amendment

to a

speedy

right to a fair

trial, and he is entitled to a speedy trial whether or not he
has a defense.
The extent of the prejudice is a factor, to be balanced
with the other factors in the Barker test.
supra. Thus, where

the delay

Moore v. Arizona,

is relatively short, or where

there is justification for the delay, or where the defendant
also

wishes

prejudice

the delay,

in

a

it might take a showing of specific

particular

case

in

defendant's rights were infringed.
is

long

enough,

prejudice

is

order to

show that

the

However, where the delay

presumed

from

the

inordinate

delay itself since the infringement of speedy trial right is
clear.

See, e.g. United States v. Machine, 486 F.2d 750, 753

(7th Cir. 1973).
Since

the

defendant's

right

-9-

to

a

speedy

trial

was

infringed, he was inevitably prejudiced to some extent, see
Moore v. Arizona,

supra, 414 U.S. at 26-27, and since there

is no showing that the delay was reasonably necessary and no
showing

that

dismissal

the

defendant

the

only

is

waived

his

speedy

remedy, regardless

of

trial

right,

the merits

of

defendant's case at trial.

Denial of Prompt Preliminary Hearing
The Brief of Respondent argues that the time limitations
of Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, do not apply
because of the provision within the rule which provides that
"these
good

time

periods

cause."

magistrate
criminal

did

case

difference

in

This
not

may

be extended

argument
extend

continued

overlooks

the time

without

fulfilling

the

by

the magistrate

for

the

that

the

ordered

the

fact

limits but

date.

purpose

There is an obvious
of

the

rule

between

continuing a case for a specified time period and continuing
a case without date.
The State's argument also begs the question by assuming
that
cause

allowing
shown."

the collateral

collateral

litigation

in this case

As the defendant has shown
litigation

was not necessary

legitimate interest of the State.

was

"good

(App. Br. 15-16)
to protect

any

But even if it were, it is

submitted that the criminal case should not have been put on
indefinite

hold,

prior

to

preliminary

collateral litigation took place.
-10-

hearing,

while

that

The defendant did not, even by silence, consent to the
delay caused by the stay order since it was obtained by the
prosecutor

ex parte

(R-27) and the continuance without date

was not entered in the presence of the defendant.

(R-4).

The defendant certainly did not consent to the delay by
defending against the collateral action,

(See supra pp. 35).

Respectfully submitted this
4th day of December, 1985.

JQfHN D". O'CONNELL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

-11-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOHN D. O'CONNELL, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant have been delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

dav of December, 1985.
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TED CAHHON

P O : i s 1980

Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Petitioner
Room C-220
Metropolitan Hall of Justice
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-7900

I J L U * ^ > X^^U
^J^y^TStsJ M2VbJw\-

U^W^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

TED CANNON,
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Petitioner

*

*
-vs*
LARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE OF
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
and THOMAS OSSANA,

ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS AND
SETTING HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI
AND/OR MANDAMAS

*
*

Respondents.

Miscellaneous No. H 3o** 8 3

Pursuant to the Petition

of Plaintiff/Petitioner, by

and through Michael J. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, seeking
relief in the form of an Extraordinary Writ and Order Staying Proceedings and Execution of an Order of the Fifth Circuit Court, Judge
Larry R. Keller presiding, and good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
on

fT'0*\

Respondents be summoned and appear before this Court
the

>y

day of Ma.nWmw, 1980, at the hour of

9.'#^ *•+* « > then and there to show cause, if any they have, why
an Extraordinary Writ as prayed should not be granted, and
2.

That all actions

now pending

in the Fifth

Circuit

Court

in Case No. 80-CRS-2108 be stayed and the Order of said Court be
dated November 7, 1980, to take effect November 14, 1980, is further
stayed pending an outcome as to the issued of said Petition.
DATED this

';

day of November, 1980.

BY THE COURT:
(<

WAW

mnb

,< ^

DISTRICT COURT JUDCE"

TED CANNON
Salt Lake County Attorney
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
Deputy County Attorney
Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 363-7900
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER REMANDING CASE
TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRELIMINARY HEARING

Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS OSSANA;
JUDGE LARRY KELLER
5TH CIRCUIT COURT

Civil No.

M-80-88

Defendants,
Pursuant to a hearing on Plaintiff's Petition for Writ
of Mandamus and a hearing conducted before this Court on November
11, 1982, a Memorandum Decision having issued from this Court on
December 15, 1981, and good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED; ADJUDGED
1.

That the criminal case Circuit Court #80 CRS 2108

be and the same is hereby remanded to Circuit Court fot Preliminary
Hearing, and;
2.

That the names of all confidential informants not

be released at said Preliminary Hearing, and;
3.

That all further findings contained in this Court's

Memorandum Decision be complied with by the Circuit Court.
DATED this

i^Say of February,

p82.

HONORABLE JUDGE DEAN E. CONDER
Judge, Third District Court
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage prepaid to
Judge Larry R. Keller, 250 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, and John O'Connell, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84110 this Z^^day

of February, 1932.

JOHN 0. W'UONNM.l.

O'CONNELL & YENGICH
Attorney for Respondent Ossana
44 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5835

Deputy Clerfc

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED CANNON,
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY,

ORDER STAYING ORDER OF
FEBRUARY 24, 1982, AND
SETTING MATTER FOR HEARING

Petitioner,

LARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
and THOMAS OSSANA,

Misc. No. M-80-88

Respondents.
Based upon the verified motion of the attorney for
Respondent Thomas Ossana, the order captioned, "The State of Utah,
Plaintiff, vs. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry Keller 5th Circuit
Court, Defendants, Order Remanding Case to Ci rcuit Court for
Preliminary Hearing, Civil No. M-80-88, if any such order did
issue, it is hereby stayed pending a hearing on Respondents'
previously filed motions for rehearing, and Respondents' motions
for rehearing are hereby set for hearing before this Court on
the /Q

^''OO

day of March, 1982, at the hour of
DATED this

/

day of March, 1982.

<—v-xl<

JUDGE
Third District Court
ATTEST

.m.

APPENDIX p

Salt Likt County Utah

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
O'CONNELL & YENGICH
Attorney for Respondent Ossana
44 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5835

MARl 1982

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED CANNON,
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY,
Petitioner,

:

VERIFIED MOTION FOR AN
ORDER STAYING THE ORDER
OF FEBRUARY 12, 1982, AND
SETTING MATTER FOR HEARING

:

Misc. No. M-80-88

:

-vLARRY R. KELLER, JUDGE
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
and THOMAS OSSANA,
Respondents.

:
:

COMES NOW the Respondent, THOMAS OSSANA, and moves the
Court, ex parte, for an order staying an order purportedly issued
by this Court on February 24, 1982, a copy of which is attached
hereto, and setting Respondents' motions, for rehearing of the
memorandum decision of December 15, 1980, for hearing for the
following reasons:
1.

On February 26, 1982, counsel for Respondent Thomas

Ossana received in the mail a document captioned, "The State of
Utah, Plaintiff, vs. Thomas Ossana; Judge Larry Keller 5th Circuit
Court, Defendants, Civil No. M-80-88, Order Remanding Case to
Circuit Court for Preliminary Hearing.
2.

Counsel for Respondent Thomas Ossana has conferred

with the Clerk of the Court and reviewed the file in this case
and there is no record of any such order having been issued by
this Court.
3.

The order is based upon the Memorandum Decision

by this Court on December 15, 1980.

4.

On December 24, 1980, Respondent Thomas Ossana timely

and duly filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, requesting a rehearing and duly noticed up said
motion for a hearing on January 14, 1981.

That hearing date was

stricken by the Court and counsel for Respondent Thomas Ossana,
after conferring with the Clerk of the Court, Craig Barlow, Attorney
for Judge Keller, and Michael Christensen, Attorney for Petitioner,
reset the matter for April 2, 1981,

That hearing date was stricken,

to counsel's best recollection, by Michael Christensen, Attorney
for Petitioner.
5.

The matter was not reset for hearing thereafter.

On or about January 9, 1981, Respondent Judge Keller

filed a motion to participate in hearing on Respondents1 motion
for rehearing.
6.

The Respondents' motions have never been heard by

this Court and Judge Keller has never been heard on the issue
of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court which the Memorandum
Decision of December 15, 1980, decided.
7.

The order of February 24, 1982, if any such order

actually issued, was obtained, ex parte, by Michael Christensen
without notice to either of the Respondents and, to counsel's
best knowledge and belief, without explanation to the Court that
there were motions for rehearing pending before this Court.

The

order assumes the action here is an appeal £nd orders the case
remanded to the Circuit Court, whereas this action was actually
a petition for mandamus and there is no criminal case before this
Court.
8.

At the time of the filing of the Respondents' motions

for rehearing, it was the intention of both Respondents to appeal
the decision of this Court to the Supreme Court in the event that
this Court did not modify its decision upon rehearing.

As this

Court noted in the decision, it was a matter of first impression
and the law was not clear.

The decision profoundly affects the

jurisdiction of Circuit Courts and litigation currently pending
in the judicial system wherein evidence was obtained by the State
- 2 -

by use of CIrcuic Courc discovery orders.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Thomas Ossana prays that the Court
stay the order of February 24, 1982, if any such order in fact
exists, and set the Motions for Rehearing, previously filed, for
hearing.
DATED this

/

day of ?jarch^>982.

7mn
Attorney for Respondent Ossana
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
COMES NOW JOHN D. O'CONNELL, being first duly sworn
and deposes and says that he has read the foregoing and the contents
thereof are true to his best knowledge and belief.
DATED this

(

day of

982,

r
JrrAVTKTtfT
T
C0NNELL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN^to before me this

*

J ^

day of

March, 1982,

TAW PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake Cc
State of Utah

My Commission Expires:

. /-J^-^7
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t I mailed a copy of t h e

foregoing

V e r i f i e d Motion for Order S t a y i n g t h e Order of F e b r u a r y 24, 1982,
and S e t t i n g M a t t e r f o r Hearing t o Michael C h r i s t e n s e n , Deputy
S a l t Lake County A t t o r n e y , A t t o r n e y f o r P e t i t i o n e r , 431 South
T h i r d E a s t , Second F l o o r , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111; and t o
C r a i g Barlow, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , A t t o r n e y f o r Respondent
Judge K e l l e r , 236 S t a t e C a p i t o l , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114,
f

day of March, 1982,

STATt OF UTAH
) ^
COUNTY Of SALT LAKS ) a >
I, f r * UNO*P*AQN€D, CtEW OF THE 0<6T*<CT
<-<?.*T Or SALT LAKE CCUNTY, UTAH. DO H5flEE/
<•> *f<FY THAT THE AV*t£XS0 „ w FO*EGON«-3 '%
A T:?Ut ANO FULL COPY OF AH CHIOINAL DOCU^^srr OH FtLE tH MY OFF'C€ AS &J*2H C *SK
W»,TNiS8 MY HAHO AND SEAA^ OF 8AIO COURT
TVHt ,"
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